Hermeneutics Seminar Paper

Here is the paper that I brought along to the seminar on 3/11/11. I'm also going to include ideas that we discussed afterwards because until we spoke about it I didn't really have a clue what I'd written.

Hermeneutics is, in short, the study of meaning in a text - or, as one German theologian (Friedrich Schleiermacher – I had fun trying to pronounce that) called it, "...the art of avoiding misunderstanding." The may make it sound a little bit like when you were forced to dissect poetry for GSCE English, but hermeneutics was first used as a tool for interpreting religious texts such as the bible - texts which have at times been wilfully misinterpreted to suit the needs of others - so having some sort of pseudo-scientific method of understanding the author's intentions is rather important. Scholars sought to achieve this through analysis of the specific words used, the syntax, and by making allowances for any historical context which may be able to explain away apparent contradictions in manner or custom.

Hermeneutics was essentially a precursor to modern philosophy of language, semiotics, and analytical philosophy: the latter being a method of tackling philosophical issues one at a time rather than coming up with sweeping answers to complicated questions - a trait all too commonly seen in idealism.

It also paved the way for the type of language seen in computer programming: language which must be logically watertight, as a computer is extremely literal and cannot infer any sort meaning.

Friedrich Frege, a German philosopher and mathematician, published a paper in 1892 titled 'On Sense and Reference', which is thought to be the first original work on the theory of meaning. In this, Frege questions whether the 'sense' of a sign (which is the way in which a term refers to the object) is truly linked to the meaning that the sign is expressing.

He uses "The morning star is identical with the evening star" as an example to illustrate this point, saying that the statement is nonsensical when viewed logically - but as soon as you apply what he calls reference (the understanding of what a word or symbol is referring to - in this case, both names refer to Venus at different times of the day) and sense (which is how a sign presents its intended meaning) you can understand the thought conveyed in the sentence.

So, when broken down in to terms that somebody like myself could understand:

Proposition: A = B ...does it? Why and how?

To understand this, you must understand the sense of both A and B to understand that both are referring to the same thing.

With this, you can see that A does equal B in this case, at least - but only because you have the right context. Frege is saying that this is how people can derive meaning from utterances that are essentially meaningless.

Frege speaks of meaning in three levels:

• Sign - the sounds you make, the words on a page, or a symbol
• Sense - expressing some sort of meaning: Anthony Kenny says that it is not merely a 'mental image', but  that it is "a common property of all users of the language" - so a sign should be universally understood.
• Reference - the ultimate understanding and connection you make in your own mind upon witnessing the sign and sense.

Frege also thinks we are obsessed with the truth-value of sentences. He highlights this by looking at works of fiction - even though we could not possibly have any reference for Odysseus in Odyssesy, we will be driven to accepting as the reference of a sentence its truth-value whether or not it has an actual basis in reality. The conception of a man called Odysseus still makes sense, even though we have no frame of reference to put him in. We want to impose some sort of value on the proposition in a sentence, even if we know that the object it refers to does not exist. This is how human beings are able to discuss metaphysical or abstract concepts.

Towards the end of his life, Frege became less concerned with applying his systems of logic to language, and more interested in the 'colour' present in expressions of thoughts. He said that this colour in language was seen in the form of interjections such as a swear word or a statement like 'Thank god!', which express emotion even though they're not full statements. Another example he gave was using an emotionally charged word in place of a plainer one – 'cur' instead of 'dog.'

No, I don't know what a cur is either, but it certainly sounds horrible. Frege said that such utterances have no effect on the logic of the sentence – if somebody uses 'cur' instead of 'dog' but does not feel hostile while doing so, it will not automatically render the statement false. He is essentially implying that language is absolute – what you say is what you mean, regardless of your real feelings. I get the feeling that Frege might not have understood jokes very well.

In 'The Thought', he explains the importance of context – in order to grasp the thought expressed in the statement using the present tense verb: 'It is snowing' then you need to know when it was uttered to know if it was true. Two people saying the same thing – 'I am hungry' are expressing two different thoughts – one could easily be true while the other is false. The same sentence can express a different thought in different contexts.

Bertrand Russell was another eminent thinker on the philosophy of language. He took particular issue with the idea of 'pragmatism' in regards to truth statements, where pragmatists would ask whether it was good to believe that a given proposition was true. He said: “It is far easier to settle the plain question of fact 'Have popes always been infallible?' than to settle the question of whether the effects of thinking them infallible are on the whole good.”

He was also uncomfortable with the idea that named objects which have a sense can be denied existence, e.g. “The round square does not exist.” Russell arrived at the conclusion that if such statements are not referring to things with proper names then they are logically permissible, because you can argue that it is false that there is an object xyz that is both round and square.

Another example given by Russell is that of truth-value gaps, highlighted in 'The present kind of France is bald.' Though the sentence has meaning, it is identified as positively false by Russell as not only is there no King of France, he cannot possibly be bald if he does not exist.

Ordinary Language

A concept proposed by Frege and Russell. It is an aim to construct language as a precise instrument for the purposes of logic and mathematics. They felt that is was important that a language should contain expressions that had a definite and unclouded sense. If sentences are allowed that are ambiguous or lacking in a truth value (that is, flowery synonyms and expressions of thought, or purely 'comment' in media law terms) then logical deduction becomes impossible.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his book the 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus', said that “language disguised the structure of thought beyond recognition. It was the task of philosophy to uncover, by analysis, the naked form of thought beneath the drapery of ordinary language.” He said that complex propositions were made up of elementary ones, and that those in turn were little slices of reality. He also believed that each of these tiny propositions were essentially mental pictures.

In the 1920s and 30s, Wittgenstein revised his opinion slightly. He thought that ordinary language was already embedded in society, and that members of certain social circles (e.g. religion) or those carrying out an activity (rugby or something) would adhere to conventions and structures that he called 'language games.' He compares understanding language to knowing how to play chess – it is a state of being rather than a process. Those in these circles use language with certain senses that only members of those circles will understand the reference for – for those outside the circle, their utterances are meaningless or don't have the same meaning.

In this, he asks why the marks on a page as ascribed any special significance – the answer is that they are given significance through understanding meaning. Anthony Kenny states that we go through certain mental events when hearing an utterance in a language we know – emotions, metal images, etc, that just do not occur when hearing an utterance in a language we do not know.

As a side note, the above is precisely why I find visiting a non-English speaking country so relaxing; you can't tune in to peoples inane conversations by accident, it's all just white noise.

Ordinary language explained badly

So, ordinary language. During the seminar, thinking of it in terms of computer programming really helped me to understand the whole thing.

Frege's assertion that statements can only be true, false or meaningless brings us to the workings of a computer at the most basic level. Binary code; 01010100101001 – it is simply on or off, true or false. There is no gray area inbetween, no 0.5 – that is utterly without meaning. Computers are relentlessly rational and cannot infer any meaning beyond pure black and white logic.

When Frege says that statements are meaningless if the words make sense but have no reference, he is taking things very literally just as a machine would: a computer only will understand and use the words or bits of code that you define to it. Computers today are so powerful not only because of the physical capabilities of processors and hardware, but also because the programming used is almost infinitely complex. Visually, it would correspond to a tree with millions of branches; and yet, right at the very core, there would be a list of very basic definitions and exceptions for rudimentary things that have to be there to enable the rest of the code to make sense. From those basics, more definitions are piled up from there. By defining certain terms (e.g. the computer recognises the command RUN as an order to open a certain program up) the computer is given sense, and the framework for the reference is the idiosyncratic syntax in a programming language by which a statement is given meaning. This is why a statement like “you're evil” would make no sense to a computer, and why in futuristic sitcoms most robots can't understand sarcasm.

A simple 'language' that most people have a grasp of is HTML, the set of rules that format graphical representations of web pages – somewhere in a browser, the rules of HTML are defined; e.g, the <b></b> tag is recognised as transforming text to bold. <b> is meaningless on its own in this blog post even though we have the sense of what it is used for, but in a html file it has sense and reference and becomes a true statement.

The reason computers crash is when a logical path is thrown up that leads to a vague, contradictory or meaningless expression. If the code cannot resolve whether a proposition is ultimately true or false, then it becomes unstuck.

Logic gates are exactly the same, and are used primary in data story systems and computer memory. A logic gate must use Fregian logic to validate what seems like a simple proposition, i.e. “There is nobody on the road.” That's not specific enough.

Ugh.

In Fregian terms, this would have to be expressed as something like, “For all possible roads, there is no man on this road. - FALSE.”